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Poverty traps occurs when agents fail to coordinate their actions to achieve the optimal 
allocation of resources. It is argued that this phenomenon makes economic convergence 
impossible and keeps agents in a poverty trap from which they cannot escape unless a 
massive and coordinated industrial policy is implemented. This analysis shows that the 
literature on coordination failures has overemphasized the significance of market failure. 
It  argues  that  coordination  is  possible  and  profitable  in  a  free  market  system.  State 
intervention  is  responsible  for  the  systematic  misallocation  of  resources 
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  1. Introduction 
 
Market failure is the utmost reason for defending an active economic role of the 
state.  Among  other  market  imperfection-based  arguments,  the  theory  of  coordination 
failure is widely used at the present by development economists to define a new case for 
industrial policy (Matsuyama, 1995; Rodrik, 2006). 
The central pillar of the literature on coordination failure is the idea that economy 
can fail to achieve coordination among complementary activities. Coordination failure 
leads  the  market  to  an  outcome  (equilibrium)  inferior  to  a  potential  situation  where 
resources would be correctly allocated and all agents would be better off. 
The  occurrence  of  these  inefficient  equilibria  or  poverty  traps  is  supposed  to 
provide an opportunity for a positive state intervention. It is argued that such situations 
can be overcome only by massive coordinated investments, something which is unlikely 
to happen if poor regions are left on their own. As Dercon (2003, p. 5) puts it, “A poverty 
trap is an equilibrium outcome and a situation from which one cannot emerge without 
outside help, for example, via a positive windfall to this group, such as by redistribution 
or aid, or via a  fundamental change in the  functioning of markets.”  In a few words, 
poverty traps can be removed by a “big push” strategy. 
  This  paper  intends  to  provide  a  refutation  of  the  idea  that  entrepreneurial 
coordination problems can lead to poverty traps. In subsidiary, it criticizes the claim that 
public intervention can improve the coordination of economic agents.  
  The paper is organized as follows. The next section puts the coordination failure 
argument  in  historical  perspective.  Section  three  describes  the  coordination  failure 
argument  which  pushes  the  case  for  industrial  policy,  with  a  focus  on  the  relation 
between  coordination  problems  and  poverty  traps.  Section  four  explains  the  role  of 
entrepreneurs  in  achieving  coordination  on  a  free  market.  Section  five  criticizes  the 
notion  of  coordination  failure  and  underscores  the  weaknesses  of  “big  push”  theory, 
explaining the risks associated with development planning. The last section concludes the 
paper.  
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2. Intellectual pedigree: Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse, Hirschman  
 
The literature on coordination problems has a long tradition.
1 A pertinent review 
of the literature on coordination failure can be found in Hoff (2000) and Hoff and Stiglitz 
(2001). Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, in his seminal 1943 article “Problems of Industrialization 
of Eastern and South-eastern Europe” argued that poor economies cannot grow because 
of  coordination  failure  among  complementary  industries.  If  industrialization  is 
simultaneously achieved in all economic sectors, industries could end up with profit, even 
though no sector would be profitable if it chooses to industrialize alone. As a result, an 
underdevelopment equilibrium was possible. To solve this problem, a large amount of 
investments are required – the so-called “big push” policy.  
In the 1950s, most economists thought that, if left to the impersonal forces of 
market,  underdeveloped  economies  would  never  turn  into  rich  and  prosperous  ones. 
Ragnar  Nurkse  (1953)  argued  that  underdevelopment  persists  because  of  a  so-called 
“vicious circle of poverty”: on the one hand, domestic market is thin because of low 
incomes and, on the other hand, the supply of goods is scarce exactly because people are 
too poor to save. Thus, the level of capital accumulation, investment and productivity is 
low. 
The assumption was that free market is unable to direct capital toward the most 
socially efficient investment projects. Unlike Nurkse, who favoured a uniform industrial 
policy – the doctrine of “balanced growth”, which required a massive investitional effort, 
i.e. a “big push” – Albert Hirschman (1958) maintained that developing countries lack 
also managerial and entrepreneurial abilities. Therefore, the optimal policy should have 
as a goal an unbalanced development, concentrating investments in those sectors with 
significant external effects, which can facilitate and promote complementary investments 
in the rest of the economy. 
The dissapointing results of state led industrialization and the collapse of central 
planned  economies  have  convinced  most  economists  to  repudiate  early  development 
models. However, although “big push” strategies seemed to be definitively expelled from 
the  realm  of  development  economics,  recently  they  have  started  again  to  claim  the 
                                                            
1 Graham and Temple (2005) consider that its origins can be traced back to Malthus.   4
attention of economists. “The big push has returned to favor in the development policy-
making, after half a century of exile” (Easterly 2005, p. 3). A good illustration of this 
change is the adoption of Millenium Development Goals by the U.N. which, claiming 
that many third world countries are kept in a poverty trap, argued for “a big push of basic 
investments between now and 2015 in public administration, human capital (nutrition, 
health, education), and key infrastructure (roads, electricity, ports, water and sanitation, 
accessible land for affordable housing, environmental management)” (U.N. 2005, p. 19). 
“Big push” policy is back in development economics because in the last decades a 
number  of  contributions  have  attempted  to  refine  the  case  for  industrial  policy  and 
ground it in a more solid theoretical bedrock. Using rational expectations hypothesis, 
several  authors  have  atempted  to  formalize  the  coordination  failure  argument  and 
elaborate a multiple equilibria theory of development. 
A reference work illustrating the resurgence of interest for coordination problems 
is  Murphy,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1989)  which  formalized  some  aspects  of  the 
Rosenstein-Rodan  viewpoint.  In  addition,  other  development  economists
2  have 
emphasized a number of situations where interdependence among private agents seems to 
produce  coordination  failures  that  prevent  economies  from  achieving  a  better 
equilibrium. 
After the publication of Sachs et al. (2004), this author has quickly become one of 
the foremost advocates of “big push” industrial policy of our times. Sachs’s influence is 
phenomenal throughout the world. He is a “guru” of economic development, “spiritual 
father” of numerous research institutes, initiatives and projects, and advisor for economic 
development  policy  in  many  countries.  Economists  like  Rodrik  (1996;  2004)  and 
Rodriguez-Clare  (2005a;  2005b)  have  used  this particular  market  failure  argument  as 
justification for a “new industrial policy”, the goal of which is to induce entrepreneurs to 
invest in those projects with the highest social return. 
 
3. From coordination failure to big push policy 
 
                                                            
2  See  Acemoglu  (1997);  Adsera  and  Ray  (1997);  Azariadis  and  Drazen  (1990);  Easterly  (2001); 
Matsuyama, (1991; 1996); and Krugman (1991)   5
As  the  coordination  externality  argument  goes,  the  economy  works  like  an 
ecosystem: 
 
“In  an  ecosystem,  a  key  factor  determining  how  any  individual  will 
behave is his environment. One of the most important aspects of that environment 
is  the  behavior  of  others.  Under  some  conditions,  ecosystems  have  multiple 
equilibria,  and  individuals  may  fail  to  “coordinate”  on  the  equilibrium  that  is 
preferred by everyone… The basic mechanics of coordination failure are simple: 
An individual’s behavior – for example, to produce or to prey on the production 
of others – creates externalities. The externalities affect not only the welfare of 
others, but also their decisions. The interaction of the slightly distorted behaviors 
of many different agents may produce very large distortions and can lead to the 
existence  of  multiple  equilibria,  some  very  good  for  every  member  of  the 
economy, and some very undesirable.” (Bowles, Durlauf and Hoff, 2006, p. 6-7)
3 
 
For  Matsuyama  (1996,  p.  2),  this  coordination  problem,  like  "the  problem  of 
hundreds of people, scattered in a dense, foggy forest, trying to locate one another – is of 
such  fundamental  difficulty  that  no  algorithm  can  solve  it.  What  the  economics  of 
coordination tries to show is that even the market mechanism cannot solve the problem.” 
A good explanation of this market failure is provided by Rodriguez-Clare (2005) 
and Rodrik (2004). The former author (p. 3) points out the fact that the success or failure 
of an action depends upon the context in which it is undertaken: “A firm’s productivity 
depends not only on its own efforts and abilities, and on general economic conditions 
(e.g., the macroeconomic environment and the legal system), but also on the actions of 
other firms, infrastructure, regulation and other public goods”.
4 
                                                            
3 “Whereas neoclassical economics emphasizes the forces pulling toward equilibrium— and with similar 
forces working in all economies, all should be pulled toward the same equilibrium, modern development 
economics focuses more on evolutionary processes, complex systems, and chance events that may cause 
systems to diverge. Thus, it tends to be influenced more by biological than physical models…The economy 
is like an ecosystem, and Darwin was implicitly recognizing that ecosystems have multiple equilibria. Far 
more  important  in  determining  the  evolution  of  the  system  than  the  fundamentals  (the  weather  and 
geography) are the endogenous variables, the ecological environment. Luck—accidents of history—may 
play a role in determining that and, thus, in the selection of the equilibrium.” (Beyond Rosenstein, p. 14-15) 
4 In such a case, the actions of different agents are “complements”.    6
On a more specific note, Rodrik (pp. 12-13) notes that 
 
“Many projects require simultaneous, large-scale investments to be made in order 
to  become  profitable.  […]  An  individual  producer  contemplating  whether  to 
invest in a greenhouse needs to know that there is an electrical grid he can access 
nearby, irrigation is available, the logistics and transport networks are in place, 
qurantine and other public health measures have been taken to protect his plants 
from  his  neighbors’  pests,  and  his  country  has  been  marketed  abroad  as  a 
dependable supplier of highquality orchids. All of these services have high fixed 
costs,  and  are  unlikely  to  be  provided  by  private entities  unless  they  have  an 
assurance that there will be enough greenhouses to demand their services in the 
first  place.  This  is  a  classic  coordination  problem.  […]  More  generally, 
coordination failures can arise whenever new industries exhibit scale economies 
and some of the inputs are non-tradable (or require geographic proximity).” 
 
Put it differently, the coordination problem illustrates the old proverbial chicken 
and egg dilemma. Agents cannot introduce a new good X on the market because they 
cannot rely on complementary suppliers of Y and Z but, in turn, suppliers of Y and Z 
have no reason to produce because there is not enough demand for their output. 
As Howitt (2001, pp. 3-4) argues, the coordination effort market participants put 
depends  critically  on  their  expectation  that  other  individuals  will  act  to  take  full 
advantage of potential gains from trade: “When people on one side of a market put more 
effort into the matching process, this makes it more worthwhile for those on the other 
side  to  do  the  same  thing,  because  it  makes  transacting  less  costly  for  them.”  For 
example,  pessimistic  expectations  on  the  part  of firms  that  they  can  find  appropriate 
workers will make more costly for workers to find suitable jobs. A vicious circle seems to 
ensue, keeping the market at distance from an efficient allocation of resources. 
Following  a  similar  line  of  reasoning,  Marshall  (p.  13-14)  provides  a  good 
explanation of what is meant by coordination failure: 
 
“Suppose the economic performance of a country (or a firm, industry, or 
financial market) depends on large numbers of investors being willing to provide   7
funds. If it is generally believed that other investors will withhold funds, it is 
rational  for  any  given  investor  to  refrain  from  investing.  Thus,  these  beliefs 
become  self-fulfilling.  This  represents  a  coordination  failure  because  everyone 
would  be  better  off  if  all  investors  provided  funds  to  the  affected  country. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to coordinate investor actions in this way.” 
 
More  precisely,  under  the  circumstances  described  above,  there  are  multiple 
equilibria: a good equilibrium, obtained when entrepreneurs have optimistic expectations 
and thus manage to coordinate their businesses, and a bad equilibrium, resulting from 
entrepreneurs’  reluctance  to  invest  and  their  failure  to  coordinate.  When  the  market 
mechanism does not work, the government should coordinate (stimulate) entrepreneurs 
into the good equilibrium.  
This policy prescription echoes the arguments of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and 
Hirschman  (1958)  who  argued  for  the  necessity  of  a  massive  and  concentrated 
industrialization  policy  (“big  push”  strategy)  in  order  to  break  the  underdevelopment 
equilibria. In light of the negative consequences of industrialization policy carried out by 
many developing countries in the 1960s and 1960s, market failure theorists are cautious, 
and insist that the solution requires skill rather than resources (Hoff, 2000). Essentially, 
the government should adopt policies that rein in the spillovers among entrepreneurs, 
paving the way for the good equilibrium. 
   
4. Alternative perspectives on coordination 
 
The proponents of coordination failure argument provide a very simple definition 
of coordination. In their view, coordination problems typically arise when “profitable 
new industries fail to develop unless upstream and downstream investments are coaxed 
simultaneously” (Rodrik 2004, p. 13). For example, “building an airport in a region that 
has no hotels would not lead to any traffic, but hotels without a regional airport may not 
be profitable either” (Rodriguez-Clare, 2005, p. 10). 
This view of coordination may be considered as simply a truism. If a successful 
investment occurs, it is profitable because it is properly integrated into a network of   8
complementary businesses. Inversely, any investment failure brings a loss because it does 
not fit in a suitable network of complementary businesses. 
The example does not demonstrate that market may fail in coordination; rather, it 
shows that not all potential activities can be brought in line into a coherent structure of 
production, and this is the reason for which some activities are not undertaken. Building 
an airport and hotels may  be  considered “complements”, but there is nothing special 
about them except the fact that they are two. We could add easily that building hotels, or 
highways, or museums, or fancy restaurants and shops, or providing ski transportation 
facilities, or artificial snow, are all complements because they can be used together. But 
the  example  does  not  say  anything  about  how  (in  what  combination),  when,  and 
especially if consumers do wish to buy their services. It does not say if consumers prefer 
to have this set of activities at 10,000 feet altitude or at the sea level. Most importantly, it 
overlooks the fact that if consumers do have a clear preference for all these (not yet 
existing) services, then they must stop supporting other alternative activities (farming or 
mining, for instance). 
It  should  be  noticed  that  any  action  or  policy  has  coordinating  as  well  as 
discoordinating  effects,  and  we  are  left  without  precise  indication  about  what 
coordination is better. 
Alternatively,  we  can  use  the  word  “coordination”  in  a  different  sense. 
Coordination can be viewed not as a problem of technical complementarity/compatibility 
between different economic units, or as a problem of synchronization of producers, but as 
a relation between producers and consumers. 
The  entire  economic  system  is  nothing  but  a  combination  of  inter-related 
production processes. An efficient functioning of this social device requires a smooth 
coordination among its various activities. Because individuals’ preferences for various 
consumption goods alter endlessly, as well as their inter-temporal preferences and the 
availability of resources, producers need to revise their plans, and the configuration of 
production is continuously reshaped. Some production processes are dropped while other 
activities are undertaken. Economic development occurs when this structural change is 
fueled by capital accumulation and the production structure is widened and deepened.    9
The market process – that is, voluntary exchanges between individuals within a 
private  property  framework  –  has  been  considered  for  a  long  time  an  excellent 
mechanism  for  achieving  spontaneous  coordination.  Adam  Smith  described 
metaphorically  the  process  by  which  general  welfare  is  enhanced  as  a  result  of  each 
individual pursuing his own self-interest, using the expression “as if led by an Invisible 
Hand.” More accurately, Frederic Bastiat pointed out that the interests of all members of 
society are harmonious, even if they occasionally fail to act in harmony with each other.
5 
However, error is inescapable. It is the result of human limited cognitive abilities 
(bounded  rationality)  and  a  highly  complex  network  of  economic  relationships.  It  is 
optimistic to think that entrepreneurial effort (within the framework of a market order) 
can  manage  to  overcome  all  coordination  problems.  Therefore,  the  existence  of 
coordination failures cannot be disputed. The very existence of success stories reported 
by business magazines, the very fact that new entrepreneurs enrich themselves suggests 
the existence of coordination problems in the first place. 
Unfortunately,  advocates  of  “big  push”  policy  are  biased  in  their  analysis  of 
market failure and poverty traps. It should be noted that development economists are not 
interested in analyzing coordination failures per se. The allocation of resources changes 
permanently, and there is a permanent need for recoordination of economic activities. 
Coordination failures happen everywhere. All regions and all countries are developing. 
Thus, in terms of coordination, the diference between rich regions (countries) and poor 
regions (countries) is only a matter of degree. (Matsuyama, 1995) Divergent economic 
evolutions  happen  all  the  time  among  various  regions  within  every  country.  But,  as 
Easterly (2006, p. 1) aptly notes, “no serious economist that I know of is proposing a Big 
Plan to triple US per capita income, or to end poverty in the US.” Instead, we hear this 
argument with reference to different countries. What is of interest is not infra-national 
coordination failures, but only inter-national coordination failures, and this for purely 
ideological reasons. 
 “The economy never reaches a state of full coordination. How close or how far 
away it is depends on how severe and how recent shocks have been in “wants, resources 
and  technology”  –  and  monetary  conditions.  The  impossibility  of  perpetual  full 
                                                            
5 See Hülsmann (2001) for a pertinent account of Bastiat’s contribution to economics.   10 
coordination is no defect of the market system. It is an inevitable consequence, rather, of 
the circumstances with which any economic system must cope.” (Yeager, p. 226) 
 
5. Entrepreneurship and coordination 
 
No  mechanism  can  help  us  to  achieve  the  perfect  allocation  of  resources. 
However, the price mechanism is superior to other alternative means of coordinating 
economic activities. This verdict is based on the following considerations: 
a.  rational calculation 
First of all, we must emphasize that in a market system coordination is possible 
because agents have a rational method for selecting what and how production processes 
should be coordinated. The essential instrument used by entrepreneurs in deciding upon 
the  allocation  of  resources  is  monetary  calculation.
6  If  their  undertaking  ends  with  a 
profit, then it means that resources were brought in line with consumers’ needs. If the 
result is a loss, then inputs were diverted from their optimal employment and wasted into 
less  important  activities.  Therefore,  entrepreneurs  have  a  robust  guide  for  selecting 
among  competing  production  processes.  On  a  free  market,  production  is  rational  and 
coherent, always subordinated to consumers’ wishes. 
b.  Incentives 
Again, this is not to say that the free market system manages to achieve a perfect 
coordination  of  economic  decision-makers.  There  is  still  plenty  of  room  left  for 
imperfections,  errors  and  discoordination,  and  the  literature  on  bounded  rationality 
provides many reasons for these failures. Yet this is a consideration of a different nature. 
The important fact is that agents have a strong weapon to fight against error. Individuals 
can  use  their  rationality  in  choosing  among  alternative  activities,  despite  any 
shortcomings that may infect their decision-making process. Investors and producers are 
stimulated to coordinate their businesses in order to respond to consumption demand. 
Failure to use resources to satisfy the most urgent consumers’ needs is penalized, while 
success is rewarded. 
                                                            
6 Mises (1920) pointed out the crucial importance of economic calculation as an indispensable tool for 
coordinating the complex network of exchanges that constitutes an advanced economy.   11 
“The entrepreneurial element in human action is the force that drives the market 
system towards a greater level of coordination. This force is unleashed because of the 
existence of pure profit that necessarily exists in disequilibrium situations.” (Sautet, p. 
31) 
Moreover,  the  presence  of  incentives  improves  the  quality  of  judgment  tasks, 
leading to a reduction of errors. Incentives affect the willingness of individuals to use 
resources to make optimal decisions. 
c.  selection 
The profit and loss mechanism provides not only powerful incentives for avoiding 
error but also serves as a test for selecting the most able entrepreneurs. Only competent 
entrepreneurs pass the market test and are able to continue to produce, and they can stay 
on business only as long as they manage to demonstrate their abilities over and over 
again. 
The  market  process  effectively  coordinates  productive  efforts  because  the 
structure of prices is shaped according to the relative importance of resources for their 
final users – the consumers.
7 More precisely, by forecasting future market conditions, 
entrepreneurs bid for resources in an attempt to increase investments in those production 
processes with the highest expected rate of return, that is, resulting in the output of those 
goods  consumers  need  most.  Thus,  because  the  prices  for  factors  of  production  are 
continuously adjusted to the expected prices of final goods, the emerging constellation of 
prices  coordinates  the  various  uses  of  resources and  result  in  a  coherent  structure  of 
production. 
 
  6. Paternalism and coordination economics 
 
Despite the profession’s tradition to use the economics of coordination failure as a 
base  for  public  policy,  a  closer  analysis  suggests  we  should  regard  this  habit  with 
suspicion. There is still a huge gap between the actual arguments about the necessity of 
solving  coordination  failure  through  government-sponsored  mechanisms  and  the 
                                                            
7 An excellent description of the coordinative property of the market process can be found in Salerno 
(1991).   12 
requirements these arguments have to fulfill in order to be considered scientifically valid. 
In what follows we will present shortly the three main arguments that can be advanced 
against industrial policy. 
a.  The information argument 
One major problem is the lack of knowledge. Each decision-maker, private or 
public,  possesses  only  very  partial  knowledge  of  the  economic  scene.  The  argument 
echoes the work of Hayek (1937; 1945), that argued that knowledge about economic 
allocation exists only in a dispersed form among individuals. Each agent do not posses a 
clear  picture  of  the  situation,  but  only  “specific  knowledge  of  time  and  place.”  The 
crucial economic problem is to coordinate these bits of separate information, and this is 
precisely what the price system can do. 
Given that policymakers are not omniscient, they cannot know ex ante the optimal 
pattern of investments and consequently, are not able to improve the market outcome. 
This objection stipulates, in a popular and condensed form, that “government cannot pick 
winners.” The history of development policy is full with wrong decisions, which wasted 
resources into wrong investment projects, creating inefficient industries and social unrest. 
b.  The incentive argument 
This  argument  is  concerned  with  the  lack  of  incentives  for  people  to 
conserve/increase the value of resources whenever they do not own (have a property right 
over) these resources. It maintains that industrial policy is an invitation to corruption and 
rent-seeking. Once the government is in the business of providing support to firms, the 
incentives’  pattern  changes,  leading  to  perverse  outcomes.  It  becomes  profitable  for 
private sector to withdraw resources from productive employment and channel them in 
the competition for political favors. Thus, such an institutional setting leads to a bad 
equilibrium, being itself a source of coordination failure. 
c.  The calculation argument 
As  Boettke  and  Leeson  (2004)  and  Beaulier  and  Subrick  (2006)  show, 
development economists have to acknowledge the fact that social planners are neither 
benevolent nor omniscient. However, the free market cannot be defended successfully by 
pointing out that policymakers do not posses enough information to allocate resources 
optimally, or by emphasizing the corruptive nature of the state. As mentioned above,   13 
some of the leading advocates of industrial policy acknowledge both these difficulties.
8 
But they believe the quality of government’s activity can be improved. Therefore, we can 
accept, for the sake of argument, that perhaps government bureaucrats are both smarter 
(and better informed) than private entrepreneurs, and well intended. This hypothesis is, of 
course,  completely  imaginary,  but  it  should  not  be  dismissed  only  because  it  is 
empirically  irrelevant.  Government  interventionism  has  to  be  criticized  granted  that 
policymakers are morally and intellectually the best members of society. 
In  spite  of  its  new  clothes,  government  interventionism  has  no  more  solid 
foundation that it ever had. The problem with industrial policy is deeper than most of its 
critics admit. Starting with Mises (1990), a large Austrian literature argued that in the 
absence of private property, money prices cannot emerge and economic calculation is 
impossible. 
As Salerno (1994, p. 112) explained, the market process transforms the qualitative 
knowledge  of  various  individuals  about  particular  market  conditions  into  quantitative 
data, i.e. market prices. Without such cardinal values, it is impossible to determine the 
relative profitability of different production processes, and therefore there is no guide for 
determining a superior pattern of resources’ allocation. 
At the limit, in a socialist commonwealth, the central planner has no rational way 
to  decide  whether  to  shift  resources  from  project  A  to  project  B.  Its  intervention  is 
arbitrary because cannot be subjected to the profit and loss test, as private activities are. 
As  Rothbard  (1962,  p.  825)  observed,  any  punctual  decision  to  socialize  investment 
introduces an island of calculational chaos in the market economy. Promises to bail-out 
entrepreneurs in case they fail to operate profitably, as Rodrik indicates, amount in a de 
facto socialization of private investments. 
The advocates of industrial policy think government can act as private businesses 
do, using the profit and loss criterion to decide between different investment projects. At 
this point, Rodriguez-Clare (2005, p. 28) believes that, “at least in principle, one could 
calculate  a  social  return for  such  an  investment.  With  limited  resources,  the  obvious 
approach would be to invest in the proposals that entail the highest social returns. The 
problem, of course, is that calculating such social returns is very difficult. One (perhaps 
                                                            
8 See especially Hausmann and Rodrik (2006) and Rodrik (2007).   14 
limited) way to interpret prospective studies is as a way to facilitate this calculation.” 
Here, the author (to his own merit) touches the real problem of industrial policy. The 
state is not an entrepreneur, so it is not in position to “interpret” prospective studies the 
same  way  private  individuals  do.
9  More  precisely,  policymakers  cannot  calculate  as 
private entrepreneurs do. Therefore, their decision is merely a “leap into darkness”. 
The public allocation of resources raises insurmountable issues. One cannot say 
whether it is relatively more successful in coordination than the market process based on 
private property. Nothing prevents a priori government-sponsored allocation to result in a 
better coordination of economic activities in a certain region at a certain point in time. 
However, there are strong theoretical reasons for which this case is unlikely to happen. 
Without the  possibility  of  economic  calculation, proper  incentives  and  an  impersonal 
selection mechanism of entrepreneurs-coordinators, the discovery of optimal pattern of 
allocation  is  almost  impossible.  On  the  other  hand,  a  market-based  process  of 
coordination includes powerful endogenous forces that systematically push the economy 
toward the best equilibrium. 
 
  7. Conclusion 
 
  In this paper I have tried to prove that the coordination failure argument does not 
provide a solid ground for a reshaping of the industrial policy because of its lack of sound 
theoretical  foundation.  We  have  seen  that  at  the  root  of  the  argument  is  a 
misunderstanding of the role of entrepreneurs in industrial organization. Although the 
lack of conceptual precision makes the case for industrial policy appealing, coordination 
analysis cannot be used to improve the allocation of resources above the level reached on 
a free market. There is no recipe for industrial policy. Government intervention intended 
to repair the supposed market coordination failure, such us cluster-based targeting and 
infrastructure development are so widely practiced not because of scientific merit, but for 
political reasons. Last, but not in the least, the rationale for “big push” initiatives fails to 
address  properly  the  information,  incentives  and  calculation  problems  which  plague 
                                                            
9 Rather, as Buss (1999b, p. 367) says, “there are only individual or group interests that use public authority 
to their benefit, often at the expense of others.”   15 
economic policy in general. Thus, numerous pitfalls prevent the “new” industrial policy 
to be considered a refined ingredient of development economics. 
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